Lens 3: Lifecycle and Labor — Materiality and Extraction

Who does the work, carries the risk, or has no recourse?

The model lifecycle and the people it affects: data labeling, content moderation, feedback work, and the labor that “automation” hides.
Modified

15 October 2026

NoteAt a glance
CautionContent note

The case describes workers who read texts about violence and sexual abuse. The page describes their working conditions. It quotes none of the texts.

Question

Who does the work, carries the risk, or has no recourse?

A generative AI system looks automatic. Behind it, people collect and label data, rate answers, moderate content, maintain hardware, and write the texts and images that the system learned from. This lens follows the lifecycle of a model and asks who works at each stage, who carries the risk, and who can object.

Core concepts

1. The lifecycle has six stages

The course uses six stages: design → data → training → deployment → evaluation → governance. The order is a convention for the worksheet. Evaluation happens before and after deployment, and governance applies at every stage. Each stage involves different people and different risks. Suresh and Guttag show that harm can enter at many points of the machine learning lifecycle, from the collection of data to the deployment of a model (2021). Weidinger et al. sort the risks of language models into six areas, from discrimination and misinformation to environmental and socioeconomic harms (2022).

Six boxes in a row, connected by arrows: design, data, training, deployment, evaluation, governance. Under each box, two lines name the people who work at this stage and the people who carry the risk. A return arrow from governance back to design shows that the cycle repeats.

The six stages of the lifecycle, with the people who work, the people who carry risk, and the questions to ask at each stage. Original diagram.

2. Labor is hidden behind “automation”

  • Ghost work. Gray and Suri describe task-based, on-demand work that keeps automated services running but stays invisible to their users (2019).
  • Fauxtomation. Taylor uses this term for systems that are presented as automated but depend on hidden human work. In her words, it “aims to disguise the real character of the work in question” (2018).
  • Feedback work. Instruction-following models learn from human judgement. For InstructGPT, OpenAI hired about 40 contractors through Upwork and Scale AI to write example answers and to rank model outputs (Ouyang et al. 2022).
  • Instructions shape data. Miceli and Posada studied outsourced data work in Venezuela and Argentina. Instructions, interfaces, and performance metrics reproduce the worldview of the requesters, and precarious conditions make workers obedient to them (Miceli and Posada 2022).

3. Extraction concerns people who never agreed

Training data come from the work of writers, artists, photographers, and translators. Their consent was rarely asked. Crawford describes the collection of data at this scale as a form of extraction, next to the extraction of minerals and labor (2021, chs. 2–3). Copyright, consent, and provenance are therefore questions of labor too.

4. Recourse is unevenly distributed

A person who is harmed by an output can often not find out which data, which worker, or which decision caused it. Bender et al. warn that undocumented training data “perpetuates harm without recourse” (Bender et al. 2021, 615).

Evidence and limits

NoteWhat the evidence shows
CautionLimits of the evidence
  • Most contracts between AI companies and suppliers are confidential. Single cases come from leaks, investigations, or interviews.
  • Working conditions differ across suppliers, countries, and years. One case does not describe the whole industry.
  • The companies dispute some details of the reported cases. The case below states where they do.

Case: safety labeling for ChatGPT in Kenya

NoteDocumented case

This case comes from an investigation by TIME, based on interviews and documents (Perrigo 2023).

To make ChatGPT less toxic, OpenAI needed a detector for violent, hateful, and sexual content. The detector needed labeled examples. From late 2021, OpenAI contracted Sama, a San Francisco-based outsourcing firm, to label tens of thousands of text passages in Nairobi, Kenya (Perrigo 2023).

Reported facts. Source: Perrigo (2023).
Item Reported fact
Task Label text passages that describe violence, hate speech, and sexual abuse
Take-home wage About USD 1.32 to 2 per hour, by seniority and performance
Workload Workers reported 150 to 250 passages per nine-hour shift. Sama said 70.
Contracts Three contracts worth about USD 200,000. OpenAI said it paid about USD 150,000, because the work ended early.
End of the work Sama ended the work in February 2022, eight months early

TIME interviewed four Sama employees who worked on the project. All four “described being mentally scarred by the work”. They had access to “wellness” counseling, but all four said that the sessions did not help (Perrigo 2023). OpenAI said that it works “hard to build safe and useful AI systems that limit bias and harmful content” (Perrigo 2023).

Why this case. The safety of a product for its users depended on work that exposed other people to harm. The users never saw this work. The case asks where the responsibility of a researcher who uses the product begins.

Activity

Build a lifecycle risk matrix. Work in groups of three or four, for 15 minutes, on paper or on a laptop.

  1. Choose the system. First choice: the system from one research-use description in your group. Use ChatGPT as in the ready-made case only when no description fits. (3 minutes)
  2. On the worksheet, fill one column for each of the six stages. For each stage, write who does the work, who carries the risk, and who has recourse. (7 minutes)
  3. Mark the stage where the risk is highest, and the stage where you as a researcher have the most influence. (2 minutes)
  4. Write one intervention for the stage where you have influence. (3 minutes)

This is the first choice. A use from your own research makes the analysis concrete.

  • Choose the research-use description with the most open questions.
  • Its author explains the use in two minutes: the task, the system, and what they do not know about it.
  • Describe the use, not the data. Do not show confidential, personal, or unpublished research data.
  • The column “who has recourse” often stays empty. Keep it empty and visible.

Use the safety-labeling case and analyze ChatGPT when no description in your group fits, or when the group prefers not to discuss its own use. The case documents one stage in detail: the labeling of data for a safety filter.

A sociology team plans to code 2,000 open survey answers with a hosted model. The matrix shows: at the data stage, the respondents never agreed to this use. At the evaluation stage, student assistants check the codes but get no credit in the publication. Intervention: ask the ethics board, keep a sample coded by hand, and acknowledge the assistants. This example is invented for teaching.

Output

A lifecycle risk matrix on one sheet for each group. For each of the six stages, it names who works, who carries the risk, and who has recourse. It marks the stage of highest risk, the stage of most influence, and one intervention.

Reading

  • Required: Bender et al. (2021), section 4.
  • Recommended: Crawford (2021), chapter 2, “Labor”, and chapter 3, “Data”; O’Neil (2016), introduction and chapter 1.
  • For the case: Perrigo (2023); Gray and Suri (2019); Taylor (2018).

Slides

Open the Lens 3 slide deck. Press S for the presenter notes.

Timing (35 minutes). Input on the core concepts, 10 minutes. The case, 5 minutes. Activity, 15 minutes. Plenary round, 5 minutes.

Prompts.

  • “Which work in your own research is invisible in the final publication?”
  • “If an output of this system harms someone, whom can that person contact?”
  • “Which stage of the lifecycle does your institution control through procurement or rules?”

Link to the afternoon. The column “who has recourse” often stays empty. Keep the empty cells visible. Panarchy asks at which level someone could fill them.

Difficult moments. Some participants work with outsourced labor themselves, for example through crowdsourcing platforms. Invite them to share practice, not to defend it. Point to fair-pay guidelines of their discipline where they exist.

Fallback. Start with the group’s own example. If no description fits, use the case. Groups that finish early can add a seventh column for “after deployment”: who maintains the system, and who deals with complaints.

References

Bender, Emily M., Timnit Gebru, Angelina McMillan-Major, and Shmargaret Shmitchell. 2021. “On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?” Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, FAccT ’21, 610–23. https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922.
Crawford, Kate. 2021. Atlas of AI: Power, Politics, and the Planetary Costs of Artificial Intelligence. Yale University Press. https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300252392/atlas-of-ai/.
Gray, Mary L., and Siddharth Suri. 2019. Ghost Work: How to Stop Silicon Valley from Building a New Global Underclass. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Miceli, Milagros, and Julian Posada. 2022. “The Data-Production Dispositif.” Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 6 (CSCW2): 1–37. https://doi.org/10.1145/3555561.
O’Neil, Cathy. 2016. Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy. Crown.
Ouyang, Long, Jeff Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida, et al. 2022. Training Language Models to Follow Instructions with Human Feedback. arXiv preprint 2203.02155. Published at NeurIPS 2022. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2203.02155.
Perrigo, Billy. 2023. “Exclusive: OpenAI Used Kenyan Workers on Less Than $2 Per Hour to Make ChatGPT Less Toxic.” TIME, January 18. https://time.com/6247678/openai-chatgpt-kenya-workers/.
Suresh, Harini, and John Guttag. 2021. “A Framework for Understanding Sources of Harm Throughout the Machine Learning Life Cycle.” Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization, EAAMO ’21, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1145/3465416.3483305.
Taylor, Astra. 2018. “The Automation Charade.” Logic(s), no. 5 (August). https://logicmag.io/failure/the-automation-charade/.
Weidinger, Laura, Jonathan Uesato, Maribeth Rauh, et al. 2022. “Taxonomy of Risks Posed by Language Models.” Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, FAccT ’22, 214–29. https://doi.org/10.1145/3531146.3533088.
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